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Political Elites and a Polity in the Making:  
The Case of the EU 
Maurizio Cotta  
Abstract: »Politische Eliten und die Entstehung eines neuen Staatsgebildes: 
Das Beispiel der Europäischen Union«. Over the past years, elite theory, with 
its explorations of the relationship between elite configurations and regime vi-
cissitudes, has made a significant come-back in the world of political science. 
There is no doubt that the work of John Higley, which has shown that regime 
types and regime stability may be meaningfully connected to the unity and dis-
unity of elites, and to elite unity being based either on consensus or on ideo-
logical conformity, has made a major contribution to this resurgence of inter-
est. Elite theory, however, has paid less attention to the relationship between 
the political elites and the transformations of the political community. This pa-
per is devoted to an exploration of some aspects of this relationship through an 
analysis of the process of European integration. This process offers a quasi-
experimental environment that can enable a better understanding of the interac-
tions between the construction of a new supranational polity and the complex 
European system of national and supranational elites. By analyzing the institu-
tional transformation brought about by the Lisbon treaty, the attitudes of na-
tional elites toward the European form of government, and the impact of the 
recent crisis on the European institutions, the article tries to establish the role 
of elites in the development of a supranational polity, and to ascertain what in-
fluence institutional transformations have had on the formation of a genuinely 
European elite. 
Keywords: political elite, elite integration, regime change, European Union. 
Elite Theory: Important Progresses and  
Some Open Questions 
Over the past years, elite theory, especially through its explorations of the 
relationship between elite configurations and regime vicissitudes, has made a 
significant come-back in the world of political science. There is no doubt that 
the work of John Higley and his associates (Higley and Gunther 1992, Dogan 
and Higley 1998, Higley and Lengyel 2000, Higley and Burton 2006, etc.), 
which has shown that regime types and regime stability may be meaningfully 
connected to the unity and disunity of elites, and to elite unity being based 
either on consensus or on ideological conformity, has made a major contribu-
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tion to this resurgence of interest. These studies have also greatly expanded our 
knowledge about the ways through which elites are transformed from being 
disunited to being consensually unified.  
It would, of course, be possible and interesting to raise some questions con-
cerning various points covered in the collaborative studies just mentioned, but 
in this article I would rather pose some new questions that seem relevant for the 
development of a full fledged elite theory of politics and which are stimulated 
by the very importance of the theoretical and empirical steps referred to earlier. 
To be honest, these questions cannot really be considered new as they had 
already been introduced in some form by classical elite theorists, such as Mo-
sca and Pareto.  
The questions I would like to examine essentially concern the power and 
genesis of elites. Most analyses take the existence of elites (particularly politi-
cal elites) and their ability to conduct business and to affect events at the level 
of the existing polity (commonly assumed to be a national state) more or less 
for granted. These assumptions, however, cannot be accepted without discus-
sion. It is true that in most cases we observe well established elites equipped 
with significant resources and appearing to be in control of the situation; yet 
this is not always the case. History is full of examples of weak elites that were 
not able to control events and who only after significant difficulties were sub-
stituted by more powerful and effective ones.  
This raises two questions: Why, and under what conditions, do effective po-
litical elites lose their grip and become vulnerable? How are new elites formed 
and what does it take for them to gain ascendancy? To these questions we can 
add one more: What about the possibility of an interregnum, a situation where 
no elite is really in control and uncertainty prevails? These questions are par-
ticularly relevant during times of regime crisis, especially regime change. Re-
gimes crises are closely linked to crises of the elites that were previously in 
power, and the transition to a new regime is often accompanied by a period of 
uncertainty on the part of the new ascendant elites. It should also be noted that 
regime change not only involves a change in the configuration of the elites 
(from divided to united, from ideologically united to consensually united, etc.), 
it typically also entails a partial or total substitution of the elites.  
There is another situation of particular interest: where the polity itself is un-
dergoing significant change. This is the situation I will analyse later. But before 
doing that, we must first look at the relationship between elites and polity. To 
avoid misunderstanding, the term polity will be used here to designate a politi-
cal community, a political space sufficiently well identified and distinguishable 
from other political spaces, and at least relatively independent from them – 
what Weber would call politischer Verband. Today the typical polity is a “na-
tion-state” or a “state-nation” if we want to adopt Linz’s specification (Linz 
1993). Political elites are typically linked to a specific polity. Other elites not 
considered here – religious, economic, and cultural – are much less “polity 
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dependent,” belonging to different spheres of influence: some may even be 
operating globally. Generally speaking, political elites are more “local” as they 
tend to be more closely connected with territorially-bounded sovereignty. This 
does not isolate them completely from broader influences that may become 
critical at times, but typically their perspective is “national” rather than “supra-
national”. The size of this national horizon depends on circumstances. It can be 
as large as Brazil or the US, or as small as Luxembourg or Singapore. The 
“national” character of elites means that the processes of formation, change and 
transformation that usually concern them take place within the existing polity, 
and are influenced by the problems and challenges that pertain to it. The life of 
political elites is also strictly connected to the institutions of the polity, and 
these institutions play a significant role in the processes of recruitment, circula-
tion and legitimation of the elites themselves. This link is especially strong in 
liberal-democratic polities where all the crucial moments of elite life are 
strongly regulated and institutionalized. In this way, the problem of elite unity 
or division is for political elites a polity-related problem. 
This being said, we cannot forget that polities are not natural givens; nor are 
they eternal. They have been constructed, they can change, or even dissolve. 
What will happen to political elites when polities change? If at some point the 
polity horizon changes (to a larger or to a smaller polity) will elites also 
change? More specifically what is their role in these transformations and how 
are elites affected by them? Without becoming embroiled in a long discussion, 
we can give some examples that indicate the importance of this relationship. 
The breakdown of the Soviet Union and the separation from it of a number of 
independent states (a change from one embracing polity to a number of sepa-
rate polities) seem to be associated with a crisis of the Soviet ruling elite and its 
inability to keep the USSR together, and to the emergence of new (regional) 
elites in the new successor polities. The case of Yugoslavia and its successor 
polities is not too dissimilar. Other interesting cases of combined regime and 
polity changes can also be seen in the former satellite states of Central Europe, 
particularly when we consider that the continuation of their political regimes 
was tightly anchored in their de facto incorporation in the larger political com-
munity of the Soviet bloc. In these states, the demise of this overarching politi-
cal entity also enabled the recovery of a fuller sovereignty, which was accom-
panied by regime changes and elite transformations. Belgium also, with its 
process of federalization, suggests close links between the definition of the 
political community, institutional structure and elite configuration (with the 
regionalization of party elites). The case of the German Democratic Republic 
and its eventual merger with the Federal Republic of Germany demonstrates 
another and more complex variation in these connected factors: some degree of 
regained autonomy of the state due to the crisis of the Soviet hegemony led to 
regime and elite crisis, which was followed by the incorporation of the Eastern 
provinces into a larger political community, which in turn meant the integration 
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of the regional elites into the institutional structures and the larger elite con-
figuration of the Bundesrepublik. 
Admittedly, these phenomena are not as frequent as other political events, 
such as electoral victories and defeats, cabinet changes, etc. Yet they happen 
and, since their consequences are momentous, they cannot be omitted from our 
theoretical and empirical discussions. To say that political science has totally 
neglected such phenomena, however, is perhaps too much, and the beginnings 
of a discussion can be found, for example, in literature pertaining to the build-
ing of modern nation states (Rokkan 1970; Tilly 1975) and in the analyses of 
state building in colonial domains (see also Higley and Burton 2006). Never-
theless, systematic research on the causal connections between polity change 
and elite transformations is still lacking. 
As it is not possible to attempt a full-fledged discussion of the “polity-elites” 
relationship here, I will first enumerate a series of simplified propositions and 
then, using a very special case of polity transformation – that is, the one con-
nected with the process of European integration – I will discuss some of the 
related elite problems in greater detail. 
1) The creation of a new polity is a major political transformation that entails 
the allocation of significant resources with which to overcome the inertia of 
the status quo. A dedicated and focused elite of “polity builders” seems, 
therefore, to be a crucial prerequisite for the success of the process. The aris-
tocratic and bureaucratic elites of the monarchy were in most European 
cases the crucial actor in the construction of national states (Rokkan 1970; 
Tilly 1975). The communist elite around Lenin and later Stalin shaped the 
Soviet Union and the Soviet Empire after the collapse of the Russian Empire 
on the wake of WW I and of the revolutions of 1917. 
2) The configuration of the elites that contributes to the creation of the new 
polity has a high probability of affecting the shape of this political commu-
nity and of its institutions. A unitary elite will probably be conducive to the 
formation of a unitary and centralized polity. Plural elites will instead create 
a more decentralized polity. This effect is evidenced by the contrasting ex-
amples of modern France and the United States. 
3) The elites responsible for the founding of the polity will most probably also 
govern the new political community, but once the new polity has been estab-
lished, some degree of adaptation to the new conditions will presumably 
take place. A broadening of the original elite circle (through cooptation or 
other means) will probably follow in order to expand the support for the 
newly created polity. The institutions of the new community will play a cru-
cial role in the reproduction of political elites, in their legitimation, and in 
providing them with instruments of political action.  
4) With the passing of time, and under the impact of internal or external chal-
lenges, developments of the new polity may force a more fundamental trans-
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formation of the ruling elites. The founding elites may not be capable of 
dealing with the new situation and may have to give way to newcomers. 
5) Finally, we must also consider that a new polity may fail and bring along 
also the failure of its political elites. 
The case of the European Union and some recent developments in the process 
of European integration offer an opportunity for conducting an exploration of 
some of these points. Originally defined as the Common Market, or the Euro-
pean Economic Community, the Europe Union (EU) has in fact had features of 
a truly political community from the beginning. These traits have significantly 
increased with the passing of time and there is little doubt that the EU today 
must be considered a polity: its well articulated system of institutions and wide 
array of policy responsibilities, together with a Europe-wide citizenship that 
has been officially recognized for some time now (Cotta and Isernia 2009) 
make the EU much more similar to existing polities (especially those with a 
federal character) than to an international organization. It seems worthwhile, 
therefore, to explore the connections between elites and European integration.  
The Process of European Integration:  
A Europe of Elites or a Polity without a Political Elite? 
The role of elites has been often underscored by studies of the European inte-
gration process. In a recent book, Haller defined the EU as an “elite process” 
(Haller 2008). Other authors have described the process of European integra-
tion as based upon the “permissive consensus” of mass opinion which has 
enabled elites to steer the process without having to pay too much attention to 
the views of the population (Hooghe and Marks 2001). 
These views, which have gained a wide acceptance, support the proposition 
that elites have been in command of the process of creating a new European 
polity. But who are these elites? The answer is rather straightforward: the na-
tional political elites of the states that decided to launch the process of integra-
tion, followed by those of states that joined later. This is not to deny the role of 
business elites, or of intellectuals and technocrats, in the elaboration of ideas 
and instruments related to the process, but ultimately decisions have been taken 
and agreements kept by national governments and their political leaders (Mo-
ravčsik 1998). In other words, national elites, legitimized through national 
institutional mechanisms, have had a predominant responsibility in the creation 
and development of the new polity and of its operating capacity. There are also 
very good reasons to believe that these national elites supported the process of 
creating a new European polity, because they saw benefits for the solution of 
problems that could not be solved effectively and satisfactorily at home (Mil-
ward 1992).  
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This however is not the whole picture. The central institutions of the Euro-
pean Union – the Commission and other bodies, such as the Court of Justice 
and the European Parliament –, have also contributed to the process. By prepar-
ing the ground, offering the solutions, implementing and expanding the scope 
of European integration, they have “filled the gaps” between the major deci-
sions made by the governments of the member states, thereby helping to con-
solidate the EU’s institutional framework (Pierson 1996). Can we say then that 
national elites have been assisted in the construction of a new polity by a genu-
inely European elite? And has the institutional system of the EU produced a 
European elite distinguishable from national elites? The answer is mixed: on 
the one hand, the institutional framework of the EU (through the Council of 
Ministers and the European Council) has carefully preserved the role of na-
tional elites; on the other hand, it has created institutions that are somewhat 
detached from the national principle and based more on the Union principle. 
However, their ability to produce a well integrated political elite with stable 
roots at the Union level has so far been limited, and it is quite evident that the 
Brussels-based politicians of the Commission and the European Parliament 
have lacked the stability, continuity, cohesiveness and organizational structure 
that normally characterizes national elites. A crucial factor in explaining these 
weaknesses is that, for these institutions, the recruiting mechanisms have re-
mained predominantly under the control of national politics. Members of the 
Commission are still handpicked by each national government (with the only 
limitation being that they must not be unacceptable to the other member state 
governments or to the European parliament). In a similar way, members of the 
European parliament are the product of national recruitment, national cam-
paigns and national elections (Verzichelli and Edinger 2005). Even if they are 
organized by European parties in the EP (Hix, Noury and Roland 2007), their 
accountability linkages are still predominantly national.  
We can say that in the case of the EU we have a situation where the strong-
est elites remain highly decentralized (at the national level), while at the centre 
there is only an embryonic and not well developed elite. The European polity is 
kept afloat by the prevailing willingness of “local”, i.e. national elites to coop-
erate (with the help and assistance provided by a, still weak, central elite). For 
this reason, it seems more correct to talk of a “European compound elite sys-
tem” rather than of a European elite. This system is composed of national elites 
that individually play the national game, but which can also unite to play the 
European game; to them must be added also the embryo of a genuinely Euro-
pean elite. This system is highly polycentric but, as we shall see, is also “con-
sensually unified”: it converges around a positive evaluation of the integration 
process. 
Starting from this general picture, we can explore the prospects for change 
and estimate the direction such change might take. I propose to do this by con-
ducting three exploratory analyses. First by examining the institutional changes 
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that have taken place in the EU with the Lisbon treaty, then by analyzing na-
tional elites’ attitudes towards the EU using the data from a recent research 
project1 and finally, by discussing how the recent global financial crisis is af-
fecting the European polity.  
The Lisbon Treaty and the European System of Governance 
Over its history, the European Union has developed a system of governance 
that is both complex and peculiar with respects to its institutional shape and 
policy responsibilities, and that is still evolving. The Treaty of Lisbon, which 
brought the difficult constitution-making process of the Union to a close, fol-
lowing the rejection of the so-called Constitutional treaty by some EU member 
states, marks the most important and recent step in this evolution. Through an 
assessment of the changes introduced by this Treaty, I will try to highlight the 
elements of continuity and innovation that are most relevant for our discussion.  
The innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty to the institutional system 
of governance of the European Union have added to the peculiarities of the 
European Form of Government (EFoG). These innovations – the new “perma-
nent” President of the Council, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, and new rules about the functioning of the law-making process 
in the Council and the role of the European Parliament in the same process – 
are interesting not only in themselves, but also for what they say about the 
nature of the European enterprise and its developmental dynamics. Even with-
out discussing the new shape of the EFoG and the importance of its recent 
changes in detail, it is possible to highlight the broad features of this new trans-
formation and to understand how they might affect the shape of European elites 
system. 
The first element to be underlined is the incremental dynamism of existing 
institutions; this is particularly evident for the European Parliament, which 
continues experiencing an incremental strengthening of its powers. The second 
element suggests a tendency to deal with the functional problems of the exist-
ing structures through the addition of new institutions. The new “longer” Presi-
dency of the Council goes in this direction. Instead of the old system of a presi-
dency rotating every six months among the members of the Council, a new 
figure is brought in from outside the Council. The new President not being 
anchored as the other members of the Council in the national processes that 
affect their duration in office is an important component of the Council, but 
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also a “different animal”. The “additional” character of the new institutional 
figure is further underlined by the fact that the traditional rotating presidency 
has not been abolished but instead has been demoted to a lower status. The 
addition of new institutions also produces a proliferation of institutions. In this 
case the consequences are quite striking: if the President of the Commission is 
also entered into the equation, then the number of “presidents” of the European 
Union now adds up to three!  
The new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy sug-
gests another type of change that could be defined as the streamlining of exist-
ing institutions: an already established institution – the High Representative for 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – has been fused with the Euro-
pean Commissioner for external relations. This simplification is however coun-
terbalanced by an institutional complication: the position of Secretary General 
of the European Council, which had previously been combined with that of the 
High Representative for CFSP, has once again been separated. More impor-
tantly, the High Representative now sits somewhere between the Council and 
the Commission, making the post-holder a hybrid institutional figure. 
These features of the post-Lisbon transformations tell us a lot about the 
process of European integration. More specifically, they suggest the coexis-
tence of a plurality of driving forces that can be summarized as:  
1) A self-generating growth factor. The development of the European polity, 
both in terms of its territorial enlargement and of the broadening of its com-
petences, requires the progressive adaptation and strengthening of its institu-
tions to make them more able to respond to decision making needs and at 
the same time more (democratically) legitimate.  
2) An institutional inertia factor. The existing institutions of the EU have by 
now developed a significant degree of entrenchment and a reciprocal equi-
librium that produces a fairly strong resistance to major changes. This fa-
vours growth through the addition of institutions, rather than through substi-
tutions and a more radical reshaping of the status quo. 
3) The fragmentation of actors and of demands. In the absence of a dominant 
actor/coalition able to produce a strong and lasting aggregation of demands 
and to offer leadership with adequate legitimacy, the processes of change 
have to face the centrifugal force of a very broad range of actors with differ-
ent preferences (big/small members; Euro-reformist/Euro-conservatives, na-
tional/European institutions, etc.). 
4) The constraints of consensus. The whole history of the construction of the 
European Union, and the prevailing rules that continue to require a very 
broad consensus for all constitutional changes, produce a large number of 
veto players that fight for their specific preferences. 
5) The compoundness factor. The persisting role of national states and their 
“sovereignty” requires EU institutional arrangements and policy compe-
tences to take the existence of national governments into account. This 
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means a way that is cooperative and interstitial rather than antagonistic and 
more radically innovative has to be developed.  
6) The legitimacy factor. The strongest sources of democratic legitimation are 
still perceived to be national, while the European democratic loop is still 
seen as weak or indirect, as in the European Parliament and the European 
Commission, respectively. This necessarily drives changes in the direction 
of the consensual model that seems more respectful of the national democ-
ratic mechanisms. 
National and Union Principles  
in the European Form of Government 
In all national systems, political life is both “national” and “local” and this is 
even more so in the EU, where politics is articulated on a “local” level (which 
in this case is the “national” level of the member states) and on a “national” 
level, which here is the Union level. To avoid confusion we will call the first 
level “national” and the second “Union”. Because of the strong identity and 
autonomy associated with the national level vis-à-vis the Union level, it has 
become commonplace to define this arrangement as a multilevel polity (Hooghe 
and Marks 2001) or a compound democracy (Fabbrini 2007), associated with 
which is the concept of compound citizenship (Cotta 2008). The “compound” 
label which I adopt here highlights the fact that the politics of the European 
Union combines two different principles and mechanisms of political legitima-
tion, very much like federal systems, in that one is based on the component 
units with their well established political foundations, the other on the Union as 
a meta-polity with its own specific and increasingly rooted identity. The most 
obvious difference with established federal systems is that the central level of 
the EU has not yet acquired a greater standing and legitimacy than that of the 
individual Member States. 
The peculiarity of a “compound” system is that the two dimensions of the 
polity (the “national” and the “Union”) coexist and neither can easily prevail 
over the other. This also means that the political weighing of preferences and 
positions with the purpose of representing them and of producing decisions 
differs depending on which of the two principles applies. A majority (however 
specified – relative, absolute, qualified...) according to the “national” level is 
not the same as a majority according to the “Union” level: the former is a ma-
jority of national majorities, the latter is a majority of the citizens. In our spe-
cific case the first type of majority is well represented by majorities in the 
Council, the second by majorities in the European parliament. It is true, how-
ever, that in the case of the EU things are not so simple. For example, in the 
Council, voting rules have become more complicated. Wherever the unanimity 
rule or the normal majority applies, each state (MS) has the same weight and 
the “national” principle applies in its pure form, but where qualified majority 
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voting (QMV) applies, the national principle is attenuated. With the Nice 
Treaty of 2003 a combination of the two principles (equality of MS and equal-
ity of EU citizens) was introduced. In fact, the QMV requires three conditions 
to apply: the number of countries (national principle), the number of country 
votes2, and the percentage (62%) of the EU population represented by the vot-
ing countries (which brings into play fully the “Union” principle). With the 
Lisbon Treaty, this rule will be changed from 2017 onwards to the simpler 
double majority3, which more clearly embodies the two principles. Even then, 
however, there will be a further complication: the blocking group must com-
prise at least four countries to make it impossible for the three most populous 
countries to prevent a decision from being adopted. Conversely, the European 
Parliament is fundamentally based on the “Union” principle: all MEPs have the 
same weight when it comes to voting. Nevertheless, even here there are some 
partial corrections: the seats are attributed to “national constituencies” and their 
allocation is based on a population measure that is corrected to the advantage 
of the smaller countries. 
The institutional shape of the European Union and its decisional rules thus 
provide clear empirical evidence of control forces in the European integration 
process. The incremental and “complicated” changes taking place in EU insti-
tutions and in their governing rules also reflect variations in the balance be-
tween the “national” and the “Union” forces at work within the European pol-
ity. The innovations introduced by the last reshaping of the institutional system 
also reflect some of the paradoxes of the EU. On the one hand they express the 
increasingly felt need to strengthen its operating capacity and its legitimacy as 
a unified polity and policy-making system. On the other hand there is the im-
perative not to unsettle the system and disturb the balance of power between 
national and Union levels. Here we must remember that national elites have 
maintained the power of veto in the European decision-making machine, par-
ticularly when it comes to “constitutional” transformations. Indeed, these pow-
ers have been even strengthened in recent times by the number of countries 
where the “permissive consensus” of public opinion has declined and national 
referenda have forced national elites to step back from their previously more 
integrationist positions. 
To sum up: the institutional changes of the past years signal the transforma-
tive dynamism of the EU, but at the same time the incremental nature of this 
trend which is strongly constrained by the compound elite system on which the 
Union is based. Conversely, the institutional system has not acquired features 
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that would provide firm support for the growth of a truly European elite. To 
complement these findings we can now take a closer look at national elites and 
their views about the European polity.  
The Views of National Elites about the European  
Polity and its Institutions 
Thanks to the two surveys conducted within the IntUne research project in 
2007 and in 2009 (in 17 and 16 EU countries, respectively) and based on repre-
sentative samples of the members of national parliaments, we can find out what 
national political elites think about the process of supranational integration. It is 
not difficult to explain the relevance of the attitudes of this “national” compo-
nent of the European elite towards deeper European integration. As we have 
just seen, the compound/multilevel nature of the European Union provides a 
very strong role for national governments as the representatives of the national 
units within the supranational institutions. In addition, as national governments 
in all member states derive their democratic legitimacy from elected parlia-
ments, the members of these institutions are de facto also part of the supra-
national circuit of representation.  
As the attitudes of national political elites toward the European Union have 
already been analysed more systematically using the concept of a European 
citizenship as an interpretative framework (Cotta and Russo 2012; Best, Len-
gyel and Verzichelli 2012), I will concentrate my attention on their attitudes 
concerning the “governance system” of the EU and on determining which 
institutions they prefer for the European polity.  
When analysing the views of national elites we are faced immediately with a 
conceptual and methodological choice: do we analyse them as a series of N 
national samples or as a single pooled European sample? In fact, our data en-
able us to do both, and both approaches are relevant in the analysis of EU poli-
tics. The reason to study national parliamentarians as a set of distinctive na-
tional elite groups is obvious: they are produced through separate democratic 
circuits, to which they are accountable, as are the national governments that 
participate in the EU Council(s). At the same time, we could view them as part 
of the compound elite system of the European polity in which they participate 
as individuals. We must also not forget that most parties represented in the 
national parliaments have become associated with the European parties. From 
this perspective, it makes sense, therefore, to analyse national parliamentarians 
as also belonging to a common EU elite. However the “Union” dimension is 
still weak, since the mechanisms forging bonds among elites across the borders 
are not yet comparable to the strength of national bonds. For this reason, I use 
both approaches with a further methodological caveat: as already stated, the 
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IntUne data do not cover all the member states of the EU4 meaning that the 
picture is incomplete. Nevertheless, all the major countries, and more or less all 
the “regions” and country groups of Europe (North/South; East/West; old/new 
Members) are included. 
As a background to this analysis, it is helpful to review some basic attitudes 
towards the EU and its further developments. As shown elsewhere (Cotta and 
Russo 2012), a large majority (86 per cent in 2007 and 90 per cent in 2009) of 
national politicians display a positive attachment to the EU; percentages that 
are not too dissimilar from those expressing attachment to their own country 
(95 per cent in 2007 and 96 per cent in 2009). Things change, however, when 
only strong attachment is considered: not unexpectedly the scores for the EU 
are substantially lower than “for one’s country” (37 per cent against 76.5 per 
cent in 2007; 41.8 per cent against 82.3 per cent in 2009). National elites pre-
dominantly accept a European polity but are still more strongly anchored in 
their national one. With regard to support for further unification, the whole 
group of national politicians reveals a significant majority supporting further 
unification (in both surveys, on a scale of 0 to 10, from “unification has gone 
too far” to “unification should be strengthened”, 57.7 per cent had a score from 
7 to 10). Overall the differences between 2007 and 2009 are rather small and, 
as yet, the financial crisis does not seem to have affected these basic positions.  
When this relationship is analysed, we find that, although a positive attach-
ment to Europe is correlated with a positive attitude towards further integration, 
the coefficient of correlation is less than impressive (Spearman’s rho = 0.228, 
significant at the 0.01 level for the 2007 data). In fact, orientations on the two 
dimensions are distributed in a way that is not completely expected. Those 
expressing a stronger attachment for the EU should also be in favour of 
strengthening the process of integration. However, about a quarter of those 
strongly attached to Europe display only medium or weak support for further 
unification; and among those who are not attached to Europe, only one-third 
are consistent in opposing unification (Table 1). These results indicate that a 
significant amount of support for further unification of Europe comes from 
politicians who do not share strong feelings of attachment, and who in some 
cases also have negative feelings. Here, we probably have to take the impact of 
a more utilitarian calculus, which can even overcome feelings of indifference 
for Europe, into account.  
                                                             
4  The countries covered in the 2007 survey were Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portu-
gal, Slovakia, Spain, United Kingdom (to these should be added a non member state, Ser-
bia, which is not analyzed here). In the 2009 survey Estonia is missing. 
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Table 1: Attachment to Europe and Support for Unification (per cent) 
































Source: IntUne survey 2007. Percentages for 2009 are not shown as differences are almost 
irrelevant. Negative attachment includes answers “not very attached” and “not at all attached” 
 
If national elites could be fully interpreted as one pooled elite group, our data 
would suggest that a clear majority of a crucial component of the compound 
European elite system supports a progress in unification. For a significant part 
of this majority, this support is backed by strong feelings of attachment to the 
new polity; for others, however, support probably stems from more utilitarian 
calculations that do not include significant affective elements.  
What happens if we break down this imagined elite group into its national 
components? Quite obviously the picture becomes more complex. With regards 
to attachment to the EU, only in one country (UK) is the percentage of those 
negatively attached to the EU prevalent (56 per cent); in all the other countries 
there is a majority expressing either a strong or a mild attachment. If we con-
sider the stronger level of support, however, only three countries (Denmark, 
France and Poland) pass the 50 per cent threshold, and just six others (Belgium, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Portugal and Spain) exceed the 40 per cent threshold. 
The remaining countries are all below the 30 per cent level. Concerning sup-
port for further unification, results are as follows: of the 17 countries, all – with 
the exception of two (Great Britain and Estonia) – have a majority expressing a 
desire for further integration. Only three countries (Czech Republic, Estonia 
and the United Kingdom) have a fairly large share (more than 25 per cent) 
expressing negative views. Thus national elites, even when considered as sepa-
rate national groups, provide rather solid support for the process of integration, 
but we must also take into account the contrary opinion of two countries 
(among which is one of the biggest countries of the Union). 
From this general picture, we may turn to the analysis of more specific posi-
tions concerning the institutional shape of the Union. With regard to the main 
institutions of the EU, the aggregate data collected in 2007 show that a very 
large majority (77 per cent, of which 43.1 per cent express strong support) 
supports the maintenance of the role of member states as central actors of the 
EU; that a bare majority (50.8 per cent) wants to attribute the role of a true 
government of the EU to the Commission, although only a small part of this 
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majority expresses a strongly favourable position; and that a very large major-
ity (72.5 per cent) supports the strengthening of the powers of the European 
Parliament.  
The attitudes toward the three main elements that compose the European 
Form of Government (EFoG) may seem contradictory and puzzling: why do 
politicians who defend the role of member states against the European Com-
mission support greater powers for the most supranational among European 
institutions, the European Parliament? The answer at first seems difficult, but a 
more careful consideration of these institutions and of their relationship can 
possibly contribute to explaining this puzzle. In the context of the EFoG, the 
European Parliament is probably seen as an instrument for strengthening the 
representative function and as a check against the dominance of the executive – 
as national parliaments were seen in the developmental stages of national forms 
of government.  
What does this mean in the context of the EU? Concerning representation, a 
polity such as the EU must be based on a combination of the two principles 
(Union and national) that are complementary rather than strictly antagonistic, 
which is typical of a compound system. In the EU, however, the “Union princi-
ple” was a latecomer in the field of representation (the European parliament 
was for a long period marginal in the institutional system), but is progressively 
gaining ground, as witnessed by the changes following the ratification of the 
Lisbon treaty and the broad support for this progress among national elites. It is 
possible perhaps to add another element to the picture. Contrary to the question 
about the governing powers of the European Commission, which could be 
perceived as more directly antagonistic with regard to the “national principle” 
(and more specifically to the role of the member states), and thus challenging 
explicitly the other important component of the EFoG, the expansion of the 
powers of the European Parliament could be seen as enhancing the role of this 
institution as a watchdog and check vis-à-vis the Commission and as an in-
strument for producing a better balance between the parliamentary and the 
executive branches of the EFoG. The latter point should obviously be close to 
the heart of any parliamentarian, national or European. 
These results are a good match with the institutional developments that we 
have discussed in the first part of this paper. The defence of the “national prin-
ciple” (the role of the member states) remains paramount, but it is balanced (or 
complemented) by strong support for a strengthening of the parliamentary 
expression of the “Union principle.” However support for expanding the role of 
the Commission (i.e. for the governmental expression of the same principle) is 
not as broad, and is matched by a considerable opposition. Those who 
“strongly disagree” reach the 20 per cent threshold. 
When we analyse the results on a country by country basis, however, the 
picture changes. While only France has a majority ready to challenge the role 
of member states in governing the EU, the majority in six countries (Czech 
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Republic, Denmark, Greece, Lithuania, Poland and United Kingdom) defends 
their central role. Other countries show more diverse patterns, and in four – 
France, Germany, Italy and Spain – less than 30 per cent strongly defend the 
traditionally strong role of member states. With regard to the role of the Com-
mission, in 10 out of the 17 countries there is majority support (strongly or 
mildly) for the idea that the Commission should become the true government of 
the Community; of the other seven, only two (Denmark and Great Britain) 
strongly oppose the idea, while the others (among which is Germany) are less 
adamantly against. As for the role of the European Parliament, a majority sup-
porting an increase in its powers can be found in all the countries, with the 
exception of the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovakia. But the strongest ex-
pression of support reaches an absolute majority only in Austria, Belgium, 
Germany and Greece, to which Italy, Portugal and Spain can be added if the 
threshold is lowered to 40 per cent.  
These results show that the distribution of national preferences concerning 
the role of crucial EU institutions is rather diversified across the countries 
examined. But what happens when we combine views about the role of mem-
ber states with those about the Commission? As has been shown elsewhere 
(Cotta and Russo 2012), it is possible to delineate three models in this regard: 
First, there is the federalist model, which sees the Commission as the true gov-
ernment of Europe and rejects the role of member states as central actors. Sec-
ond, we have the intergovernmental model that proposes the opposite to the 
federalist model; and third, there is the compound model that combines support 
for the Commission and for the role of member states. Overall the second 
model finds most favour among national political elites (41 per cent), but is 
followed closely by support for the third model (35 per cent), leaving the first 
to be approved of by a rather smaller minority (16 per cent). When we analyse 
the results on a country by country basis, significant variations emerge (Table 
2). The intergovernmental model is supported by an absolute majority in five 
countries, and obtains a relative majority in another three; in seven countries, 
the compound model is the most preferred model, while the federal model wins 
in only France and Italy, but receives larger support than the inter-govern-
mental model in five countries. 
If these views were translated into coherent positions at the bargaining table 
when designing the institutions of the European Union, finding a positive solu-
tion would require a rather complex institutional model. As we have shown in 
the first part of this paper, this is very much what happened in negotiations 
leading to the Lisbon Treaty.  
The 2009 wave of interviews enables us to explore further aspects of the in-
stitutional preferences of national political elites. One of the new questions 
asked in this wave of data collection was about support for a President of the 
European Union: the overall support for such an institutional figure (which 
would strengthen the Union principle) was large (almost 60 per cent; see Table 
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3). But when we examine countries individually, only nine out of sixteen show 
a favourable majority, and the polarisation between supporters and opponents 
is quite evident. This is a clear case where a large overall majority translates 
into a much thinner majority when seen at the national level. 
Table 2: Distribution of Preferred Models of Government across Countries 
(per cent) 
Country Intergovernmentalist Compound Federalist 
Great Britain 90.0 2.0   2.0 
Denmark 74.6 13.6   3.4 
Czech Republic 65.0 23.7   8.7 
Slovenia 60.0 28.7   6.2 
Germany 54.0 21.6 13.5 
Portugal 48.7 27.5 15.0 
Austria 48.0 23.0 16.0 
Lithuania 45.0 46.2   2.5 
Poland 41.2 45.0   5.0 
Estonia 37.5 36.1   8.3 
France 29.5 11.5 35.9 
Greece 26.7 51.0 10.0 
Hungary 25.3 40.5 26.6 
Belgium 25.3 39.0 33.0 
Bulgaria 25.0 58.3   9.7 
Italy 20.2 32.1 33.3 
Spain 18.5 47.8 28.3 
Source: IntUne survey 2007. The countries are ordered by decreasing support for the intergov-
ernmentalist model. The countries in bold are those for which the inter-governmentalist solu-
tion is the strongest and also wins over the other two positions combined. The countries in 
italics are those showing a greater support for the federalist solution than for the inter-
governmentalist. In all the other countries federal and compound model combined win at least 
a relative majority. The percentages in bold indicate where the compound model is the pre-
ferred one. The percentages do not add to 100 per cent because of a group which votes nega-
tively on both points (role of the Commission and role of the Member States). 
 
When asked how this President (with a no-defined role) should be elected or 
nominated, only a minority preferred nomination by the European Council (the 
most intergovernmental solution), while an almost absolute majority supported 
election by the European parliament (thus combining the parliamentary model 
and the Union principle). A fairly significant group also supported the idea of 
direct election by European citizens (presidential model and Union principle).  
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Table 3: Support for Different Institutional Changes (per cent)  
 
Having a President 
of the EU 
Extending majority 
voting in the 
European Council 
Most important European 
decisions by a majority 
of all EU citizens via a 
popular referendum 
Austria 42.2 57.8 50.0 
Belgium 80.9 80.0 36.4 
Bulgaria 63.6 54.9 78.7 
Czech Republic 31.8 38.5 58.1 
Denmark 42.1 74.4 22.7 
France 68.2 87.1 34.3 
Germany 69.7 70.7 29.5 
Greece 78.0 73.2 58.5 
Hungary 78.3 76.6 31.9 
Italy 85.1 75.0 47.1 
Lithuania 34.8 68.6 59.4 
Poland 30.6 69.6 54.1 
Portugal 73.0 74.6 59.7 
Slovakia 37.7 57.1 47.8 
Spain 92.4 88.6 55.0 
United Kingdom 38.7 57.1 24.4 
Total 59.9 69.8 46.7 
Source: IntUne survey 2009. Countries in bold are those expressing a majority in favour of 
having a President of the EU. Favourable answers include “strongly in favour” and “somewhat 
in favour.” 
 
On a country basis, the parliamentary solution finds an absolute majority in six 
countries, whereas the presidential (direct election) scheme is supported at this 
level by only one. Appointment by the European Council does not reach a 
majority in any country, and is the preferred solution only in Great Britain. 
The survey covered also other aspects that can affect the EFoG such as sup-
port for extending the role of majority vote in the European Council and for 
having important decisions concerning the EU taken by a majority of al Euro-
pean citizens via Europe wide referenda (see Table 3). Without going into a 
detailed analysis of these data we can highlight that a solid majority supports 
the extension of the majority vote in the European Council. Only in the Czech 
Republic does the negative position prevail, but in Austria, Bulgaria and the 
United Kingdom the opponents reach more than 40 per cent. With regard to the 
European referendum attitudes are more lukewarm. Only in eight countries 
there is a favourable majority and globally supporters do not reach the 50 per-
cent threshold. 
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Table 4: The Designation of the EU President (per cent) 















Austria 31.1 55.6   8.9 4.4 100 (45) 
Belgium 47.8 40.3   7.5 4.5 100 (67) 
Bulgaria 46.4 46.4   5.4 1.8 100 (56) 
Czech Republic 23.8 64.3   9.5 2.4 100 (42) 
Denmark 19.5 36.6 36.6 7.3 100 (41) 
France 20.9 43.3 26.9 9.0 100 (67) 
Germany 30.3 64.5   3.9 1.3 100 (76) 
Great Britain 32.9 27.1 38.6 1.4 100 (70) 
Greece 36.6 48.8   9.8 4.9 100 (41) 
Hungary 14.1 70.3   9.4 6.3 100 (64) 
Italy 36.8 57.4   5.9 - 100( 68) 
Lithuania 29.9 61.2   9.0 - 100 (67) 
Poland 32.1 42.3 21.8 3.8 100 (78) 
Portugal 51.6 31.3 17.2 - 100 (64) 
Slovakia 33.8 48.5 16.2 1.5 100 (68) 
Spain 37.2 46.2 14.1 2.6 100 (78) 
Total 33.2 48.8 15.0 3.0 100 (992) 
Source: IntUne survey 2009. 









Extension of Majority vote (strongly agree) 49.4 26.5 18.1 
Support for having a President of the EU 92.9 70.2 36.8 
President nominated by the European 
Council 
5.5 14.2 20.9 
Most important decisions to be taken by a 
majority of EU Citizens through a referen-
dum (strongly agree) 
8.7 16.0 20.0 
Source: IntUne survey 2009. 
The figures indicate the percentage of supporters of each of the three models who also support 
the four institutional changes. The column percentages do not add to 100% because they are 
the result of different questions. 
 
If we compare these choices and national elite’s preference for the comprehen-
sive institutional model, the relationships are significant (see Table 5). Particu-
larly strong is the connection between the preferred model of governance and 
support for having a president of the EU (but not so much when the method of 
nomination is included) and also for the extension of the majority vote. Inter-
estingly enough support for a European referendum on important decisions is 
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more strongly supported by inter-governmentalists than by federalists! Is it 
because inter-governmentalists perceive (with some good reasons) voters as 
being more prudent on European developments than elites and thus conceive 
referenda as defensive instruments against further development of integration? 
These results provide some further illustration of the complexity of the 
European elite system. The complexity has not only to do with the multiple 
(national and Union) levels and the compound character of this system, but also 
with the variety of views and preferences that are articulated at the national 
level. As we have seen from the IntUne survey data, behind the broad support 
for the supranational polity and the pursuit of the integration process, national 
politicians express rather different views when it comes to designing the insti-
tutional structure of the EU. Since via their governments, national elites have 
the power of veto over all major Union decisions, it is not surprising that com-
plex institutional schemes such as those provided by the Lisbon Treaty are 
produced. 
The Financial Crisis of 2008-2011  
and its Impact on the Union 
In the previous sections, I have discussed how the institutional system of the 
EU has evolved and analysed the views of national elites concerning develop-
ments related to the EU system of governance. While results highlighted a 
significant degree of parallelism between opinions and real world change, what 
emerged fundamentally is that, given the absence of a dominant actor (or 
dominant coalition), and given the variety of elite preferences about the goals 
and instruments related to deeper EU integration, construction of the EU has 
progressed according to a compound model combining elements of different 
models. The resulting system of governance has a kind of circular effect, 
whereby the system continues to protect the role of national elites and provides 
only to a limited extent institutional opportunities for a more integrated Euro-
pean elite to develop. In this way, the construction of a truly European elite 
progresses very slowly and at the margins, leaving the European elite system 
largely dominated by national elites that by definition have a mixture of con-
verging and diverging interests and views.  
The third step of our inquiry is to examine how such a system behaves dur-
ing a crisis and to see whether such a challenge produces more significant 
changes in the European polity, particularly with regard to its elite and institu-
tional configuration. Such a crisis was triggered at the end of 2007 by the sub-
prime mortgages defaults in the USA. Although not arising in Europe, this has 
proven to be a particularly serious test for all developed countries and for the 
ability of their political elites to make quick and effective decisions in order to 
reduce the negative impact of the successive emergencies that followed: the 
financial and banking crisis, the recession and unemployment crisis, and later, 
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the sovereign debts crisis. How has the European Union, especially its inner 
core group of countries, faced this crisis? How have a multilevel polity and its 
“compound elites system” combining national and supranational levels of 
decision reacted to this challenge? To what extent have national uncoordinated 
answers prevailed or been balanced by cooperative efforts or truly suprana-
tional interventions? Which component of the European elite system has taken 
the lead in front of these problems? And what have been the consequences for 
the development of a European polity? To what extent has this crisis changed 
the internal equilibrium of the system? 
Some preliminary answer can be reached by examining the main decisions 
that have been adopted in this period. In any case it is easy to see that the Euro-
pean polity, its identity, and its internal equilibrium have been under serious 
stress during this period. More than at other occasions, the relationship between 
national and Union levels has been critically discussed and assessed. Not unex-
pectedly, the reactions of the European system to the various aspects of the 
crisis have been slower, weaker, more “polycentric” and less systematic than 
those of a national state (for instance, the U.S.). At the same time, it must be 
acknowledged that these reactions have progressively generated considerable 
changes in the institutional system of the EU, and potentially also in its elite 
system.  
When, in the first stages of the global crisis, the banking systems were hit 
and economies world-wide went into recession, national governments every-
where reacted with a variety of instruments to help support their own countries 
and to avoid a worsening of the situation. This was also the case for EU mem-
ber states. Their first actions, which generally consisted of support for their 
banks and other economic institutions, were fundamentally guided by national 
self-interest and were uncoordinated at the European level. National elites, 
faced with the risk of bank defaults and high rises in unemployment resorted to 
their traditional repertoire of instruments of economic intervention (plus some 
new, less traditional tools, which were quickly devised) without waiting for a 
common European response. Due to the high coordination costs and the lack of 
experimented European tools such a response would have been rather difficult 
to put swiftly in place. If national actions pretended to show that within the 
European shell, national elites still had the capacity to act, they were definitely 
not the end of the story: uncoordinated actions were soon seen as having a 
negative impact upon the rules and principles of the common European market. 
This, and the failure of purely national measures to solve the problems fully, 
stimulated demand for coordinated and common action, which institutions of 
the EU (especially the Commission) were keen to encourage. These actions, 
however, were slower to arrive and were primarily of a defensive and reactive 
nature: their purpose was mainly to avoid too much damage to the continued 
construction of Europe. Among these actions, one can highlight the creation of 
new procedures and institutions at the Union level with the purpose of harness-
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ing national actions and making them more compatible with a common interest. 
Putting in place more active instruments of intervention took much longer, and 
initially only ad hoc measures related to a specific situation were introduced 
that were only followed later by more comprehensive and general instruments. 
The different phases of the crisis touching in turn the banking system, the 
growth rates of the economy, national budgetary policies, and the sustainability 
of the sovereign debt, have triggered a variety of responses. 
The bank crisis occurred because there is no common European surveillance 
system (the ECB does not have such powers), but the seriousness of some of 
the cases and the subsequent consequences soon stimulated debate about the 
need for financial supervision within the EU to go beyond the purely national 
level of control. One result was the creation of new supervisory authorities for 
banking (the European Banking Authority), insurance (the European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Authority) and securities sectors (the European 
Securities and Markets Authority).5 These authorities, which became opera-
tional in 2011, will not substitute but rather complement existing national ones, 
and contribute to their coordination. It must also be noted that solving the bank 
crisis created a major burden for some states with important consequences for 
their budgetary discipline (and thus for the other dimensions of the crisis).  
Also concerning the stimulation of the economy to drive it out of the reces-
sion the intervention of the EU was almost absent compared to that of national 
states. Given the limited budgetary resources of the Union, any serious inter-
vention would have required a major change in what is probably the most deli-
cate and crystallized equilibrium of the European polity, the allocation of re-
sources between national and supranational levels. Indeed, a debate about the 
possibility of issuing “Eurobonds”6 to pay for common investments as an in-
strument for stimulating growth began but no decision was taken. In fact, the 
only “European actor” that acted concretely on this aspect of the crisis and 
obviously only within the limits of the Eurozone was the European Central 
Bank, which introduced some measures for expanding the liquidity of the mar-
ket, but still with some restraint, given its fears of growing inflation, which 
induced it to make a somewhat contradictory move and raise interest rates 
twice in 2011. 
As can be seen, the Union was not a very significant mover, at best making 
some effort towards coordination. Its lack of operational capacity stimulated 
some limited institutional changes and discussions about future changes. More 
relevant things did happen, however, in other fields where the crisis had a more 
                                                             
5  The decision was taken in September 2010 by the Council of Financial ministers (ECOFIN) 
in agreement with the European Parliament. 
6  Eurobonds, i.e. securities issued by a European authority, are not a new topic as they had 
been proposed already in the past, notably by Jacques Delors. The discussion about them 
has become with the crisis less academic and more intense. 
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direct effect on areas where European integration has gone further (but is also 
limited to only some of the member states, those who are part of the Eurozone). 
This has been the case in particular for national budgetary policies and their 
discipline. 
It is relevant to devote some attention to this topic as it offers a clear exam-
ple of a typical “European”, incremental process of institution building. The 
principle that members of the Euro group should maintain budgetary discipline 
in order to protect the Euro from excessive state deficits and high state debts 
had been established along with the adoption of the common currency. But the 
“Stability and Growth Pact” of 1997 that embodied this rule was too weak to 
prevail over national decisions, so that, in 2005, it was not too difficult for 
France and Germany to bend the rules and violate the three per cent deficit 
threshold fixed by the Pact. This, and the much bigger deficits produced by the 
counter-cyclical measures introduced by member states, have forced the Union 
to upgrade its instruments of control. In September 2010, the decision was 
adopted to put the so called “European semester” – a procedure by which na-
tional budgets have to be examined and verified for adherence to the economic 
policy guidelines of the community before they can be finalised by national 
authorities – into operation from 2011 onwards. The European powers of con-
trol were thus augmented, although remaining predominantly of a regulatory 
and reactive type. Nevertheless this measure introduced a potentially important 
change: a fundamental instrument of national policy-making was now subject 
to some sort of common European process and the (partial) control of European 
authorities.  
With the spreading of the crisis to the field of sovereign debt, it became 
clear that reactive and regulatory means were insufficient to avoid the possibil-
ity of national defaults and to protect the common currency from their negative 
consequences. This opened a dramatic soul searching exercise, involving na-
tional elites and the embryonic European elite, on the principles to be followed 
and the instruments to be adopted. The questions were at the same time practi-
cal and normative: what should be done in order to avoid the default of one or 
more countries; was it right to save “profligate countries;” and to what extent 
did solidarity within the Eurozone and among its member countries have to be 
pushed? These were also questions about the interests (national or European) at 
stake, and about the responsibilities of the political elites. As in the case of the 
rules of budgetary discipline, the search for solutions has been incremental, but 
this time the pace has been more rapid, essentially because of the accelerating 
pressures coming from the financial markets and the default risks extending 
rapidly from Ireland, to Greece and Portugal, and then possibly to Italy and 
Spain, and maybe even France! 
The creation of a fund that would operate as a safety net for a European 
country facing solvency problems was at the centre of the discussion. Why 
should other more prudent countries prevent the default and share the responsi-
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bilities of the countries in difficulty? How large should the intervention fund 
be? Should such interventions be carried out on an ad hoc basis or through a 
permanent instrument? Who should be in charge of guiding the operations? 
This debate has generated an interesting and tense dialectic between the differ-
ent components of the European elite system. National elites of the potentially 
contributing and the potentially receiving countries have participated actively, 
on one side echoing the resentment of public opinion against having to shoul-
der the costs of the failure of another country, and on the other side, showing 
reluctance to accept the conditions attached to the external help. In this case, 
perhaps more than in any other, what may be rightly called a component of the 
truly European elite – the leadership of the European Central Bank (ECB) – has 
participated with a strong voice in the discussion defending the principle that a 
member of the Euro should not be left to fail, lest the credibility of the common 
currency is seriously damaged. As a result of this debate, which extended more 
or less over a year and a half, the Union has progressed from ad hoc to general 
and from smaller to larger instruments of intervention. The twin principles of 
stronger solidarity within the Eurozone and stronger accountability of national 
decision-makers with regard to the EU have made important step forward. 
Although the process is far from finished, its provisional results signal not only 
a policy change, with the readiness to sustain countries in difficulty7 and the 
creation of new institutions in 2010 – the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) and the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) – and in-
struments to manage the problem, but also the strengthening of the principle of 
European solidarity. All this may be interpreted as a significant step forward in 
the polity building process. It is interesting also to notice that the most impor-
tant of these institutions, the EFSF, which was endowed with a large fund 
guaranteed by all Euro states to provide loans to Eurozone countries, already 
had to be reformed within the first year8 to expand its resources and to enable it 
to use a wider spectrum of instruments (among which is also the possibility of 
buying national securities). Moreover it was decided to transform what was 
originally conceived as a temporary facility into a permanent instrument. At the 
same time the interventions of the ECB for sustaining the ability of indebted 
nations to borrow was significantly stepped up during summer 2011.  
The crucial contribution of the ECB technocracy in producing a European 
response to this aspect of the crisis may be interpreted as indicating a step 
forward in the formation of a genuinely European elite. This, of course, should 
not make us to forget the importance of the role of national leaders (particularly 
those of the big countries like France and Germany) and of the intense sum-
mitry activity they have conducted in this period. But the existence of another 
voice, less affected by the constraints originating from national accountability 
                                                             
7  In practice, this meant bending the treaty rule that explicitly excluded a community bail out. 
8  According to a decision of the European Council of July 2011. 
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mechanisms, was an important factor in asserting a more explicit conception of 
the European interest. 
If we now take stock of this discussion, we can highlight two main devel-
opments. First, we have a stricter subordination of national decisions to Euro-
pean scrutiny with the purpose of preserving the Union norms. Second, we 
witness the creation of a more articulated system of central institutions en-
dowed with greater resources and powers of intervention vis-à-vis member 
states. Under this heading we must also underline the strengthening of an exist-
ing institution (the ECB). These developments have not subverted the basic 
structure of the European polity but have significantly altered the internal bal-
ance between its components and levels. The role of national elites has not 
been suppressed, but has been further constrained into more Union-based pro-
cedures in which they have to participate. Union level technocratic elites (be-
longing to the ECB, the Commission and other new authorities) have received 
further powers to regulate, scrutinise, criticise and, in part, substitute or direct 
the actions of national elites. This impact is obviously more significant for the 
weaker member states that have become more dependent on external help9. 
The crisis has revealed that national, democratically elected elites are losing 
control of crucial decisions at the expense of Brussels-centred technocratic or 
bureaucratic elites. It has also contributed to empowering European elites, so 
that the balance of responsibilities can be seen to have shifted towards the EU 
institutions and their elites. In this way, however, the European polity appears 
increasingly unbalanced from the democratic point of view: the empowerment 
of European elites has so far mainly affected its technocratic and bureaucratic 
components with a very indirect democratic legitimacy, and it is unclear to 
what extent the various national populations will be willing to accept the reci-
pes for the solution of the crisis offered by these elites. This is all the more so if 
the success of the solutions is not very evident or is delayed, while sacrifices 
are immediate and apparent. The fragility of their political legitimation may be 
quickly exposed, and with it that of the European polity they increasingly try to 
keep afloat. 
In a world where democracy is the supreme political value, such techno-
cratic elites cannot be completely self-sufficient; they need other authorities to 
select them. The fact that this cannot yet be done by Europe-wide democrati-
cally selected elites produces a striking imbalance between weakened but de-
mocratically accountable national elites and strengthened but democratically 
                                                             
9  A good example was the sudden decision of the Italian government in August 2011 to 
change its budgetary framework, which had been introduced just a month before, and to 
advance the balancing of the budget by one year to 2013. This extraordinary step was ex-
plicitly requested by a letter of the ECB to the Italian government as a precondition for the 
decision of the Central Bank to buy on a large scale on the secondary market Italian treas-
ury bonds and thus contribute to pushing down their interest rates. 
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not accountable European elites. The ability of these elites not only to develop 
the solutions but also to “sell” them to the public is thus problematic. Equally 
problematic is their ability to contribute to the development of a more cohesive 
supranational identity and solidarity, without which there can be no willingness 
for sacrifice. The risk is that national (democratic) elites will oscillate between 
compliance and complaint, but without fully taking the responsibility for diffi-
cult decisions. A serious political problem then lies ahead for a European pol-
ity. 
Conclusion 
The broad support for the European polity and the institutionalisation of its 
structure enables an incremental development of its institutions and the build 
up of new ones. This, however, happens only along the lines of a multilevel 
and compound model that tries to safeguard a delicate balance between na-
tional and Union levels. This effort tends to produce an increasingly compli-
cated (and often burdensome) institutional system. It has also important and 
interesting effects for the development of the European elite system. Thanks to 
the increasing role assigned to the EU level in solving some problems that 
nation states are not able to deal with, the development of a truly European 
elite system is bound to speed up. But this happens essentially to the advantage 
of a technocratic and bureaucratic elite. National democratic elites seem more 
ready to accept the strengthening of an elite type that is very different (in terms 
of skills, legitimacy, etc.) from them. Strong central technocratic and bureau-
cratic elites have a crucial role to play in order to ensure the implementation of 
(national) commitments in a very decentralized Union. National political elites 
are much more reluctant to give way when it comes to the political legitimation 
of important policies. This leaves the problem of the legitimacy of the suprana-
tional polity and of its policies unsolved and probably aggravated. 
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